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Abstract 1 
In a body of research spanning three decades, Janet Starkes and her colleagues 2 
have produced a wealth of empirical evidence on the importance of deliberate practice in 3 
the development of elite performers. Within this corpus of work, a number of studies 4 
have alluded to the important role that self-focused attention plays in helping skilled 5 
athletes to refine inefficient movements during deliberate practice. Unfortunately, these 6 
studies have largely under-represented the role that somatic awareness plays in 7 
facilitating further improvement amongst sports performers who have already achieved 8 
elite status. In seeking to address this issue of continuous improvement in elite athletes, 9 
the current paper marshals evidence to suggest that reflective somatic awareness plays an 10 
important role in the practice activities of elite performers. In particular, we argue that 11 
such awareness enables elite athletes to consciously and deliberately improve their 12 
movement proficiency. More generally, we propose that Shusterman's (2008) theory of 13 
“somaesthetic awareness” offers expertise researchers a potentially fruitful theoretical 14 











Toward an explanation of continuous improvement in expert athletes: The role of 22 
consciousness in deliberate practice 23 
For over three decades, Janet Starkes and her colleagues have investigated the 24 
psychological foundations of expertise in motor performance. Whereas her early research 25 
(e.g., Starkes & Allard, 1983) elucidated perceptual-cognitive differences between expert 26 
and novice athletes, subsequent studies (e.g., Starkes, 2000) drew on the theory of 27 
“deliberate practice” (i.e., sustained engagement in training activities that are “very high 28 
on relevance for performance, high on effort, and comparatively low on inherent 29 
enjoyment”; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Rӧmer, 1993, p. 373) to explore how athletes’ 30 
practice activities paved the road to expertise. In this commentary, we take up the 31 
challenge of trying to understand a relatively neglected aspect of this otherwise well-32 
charted road to expertise – namely, the issue of “continuous improvement” in individual 33 
sport athletes. This latter term refers to the phenomenon whereby certain elite sports 34 
performers appear to be capable of continuously improving their skills through deliberate 35 
practice, even after they have become experts. For us, continuous improvement among 36 
expert athletes is an important topic because it raises an intriguing puzzle. Put simply, 37 
what theoretical mechanisms explain the fact that for some expert athletes, performance 38 
improvements do not “level off” with increased practice but actually continue, thereby 39 
confounding the asymptotic effects predicted by the power law of practice (Newell & 40 
Rosenbloom, 1981)? 41 
A finding consistent across much of the deliberate practice literature (e.g., Deakin 42 
& Cobley, 2003; Starkes, Deakin, Allard, Hodges, & Hayes, 1996; Young & Medic, 43 
2008; Young & Salmela, 2002) is that highly-skilled performers engage in practice 44 




activities which require their “full attention and concentration” (Ericsson, 2006, p. 700) to 45 
gradually improve their performance by correcting specific weaknesses. For example, 46 
Deakin and Cobley (2003) found that elite-level figure skaters devoted conscious 47 
attention to the improvement of inefficient jumps and spins during practice. Similarly, 48 
Starkes et al. (1996) discovered that wrestlers concentrated on consciously refining their 49 
technique during ‘mat work’ with a partner. Interestingly, in evaluating the role that 50 
consciousness plays in facilitating athletic expertise, some disagreement appears to exist 51 
among psychology researchers. Specifically, whereas some investigators (e.g., Masters & 52 
Maxwell, 2008) have cautioned against the use of self-focused attention to alter habitual 53 
movement patterns, others (e.g., Gray, 2004) have suggested that conscious bodily 54 
awareness is necessary to improve problematic or ‘attenuated’ habits. In line with the 55 
latter perspective, and with findings from deliberate practice research, Beilock, Carr, 56 
MacMahon, and Starkes (2002) postulated that skill-focused attention may help 57 
performers during practice to consciously dismantle aspects of their technique that have 58 
been identified as inefficient on the basis of self-regulation of their actions. Researchers 59 
argue that having altered the inefficient movement in the practice context, athletes can 60 
relinquish conscious attention and allow the newly learned technique to be performed 61 
automatically or with minimal conscious control (see Gray, 2004; Jackson & Beilock, 62 
2008) during competitive performance. Unfortunately, neither research in motor learning 63 
(e.g., Beilock et al.'s work) nor that in deliberate practice has adequately explained how 64 
performers appear capable of moving from a reflective mode of bodily awareness (i.e., 65 
one that occurs when correcting skills during practice) to a largely automated state (i.e., 66 
as typically occurs during competitive performance) and vice versa.  67 




In addressing this issue, we propose that the concept of ‘somaesthetic awareness’ 68 
(see Shusterman, 2008; 2012), or heightened body consciousness, may help us to 69 
understand how expert performers avoid “prematurely arrested development” (Ericsson, 70 
2013, p. 893) by alternating between reflective (in the practice context) and unreflective 71 
(in the performance context) modes of bodily awareness. To achieve this aim, we draw 72 
on empirical evidence and a theoretical argument concerning possible mechanisms 73 
underlying continuous improvement in expert performers. The theoretical argument 74 
comes mainly from Shusterman's (1999, 2008, 2011) philosophical proposal that 75 
'somaesthetic' training (which involves paying heightened attention to and mastery of our 76 
somatic functioning) is crucial for skill-learning and continuous improvement. The 77 
empirical evidence comes mainly from studies of conscious 'fine-tuning' processes in 78 
expert performers (e.g., see Collins, Morris, & Trower, 1999; Hanin, Korsus, Jouste, & 79 
Baxter, 2002).  80 
Shusterman's (2008, 2011) theory of bodily awareness is rooted in an 81 
'embodiment' approach to the mind - the idea that cognitive representations are grounded 82 
in, and stimulated by, sensorimotor processes (see more detailed discussion in Glenberg, 83 
Witt, & Metcalfe, 2013; Laakso, 2011). According to Wilson and Golonka (2013), the 84 
theory of embodied cognition is “the most exciting idea in cognitive science right now” 85 
(p. 1) because it challenges us to consider the possibility that bodily processes rather than 86 
brain states help us to achieve many of our everyday cognitive goals. In emphasizing that 87 
human consciousness is grounded in bodily movements and awareness Shusterman 88 
(2011) postulated that “heightened somatic consciousness can improve proficiency” (p. 89 
321). What intrigues us about this embodiment proposal is that it runs counter to received 90 




wisdom in sport psychology (e.g., see Masters & Maxwell, 2008; Wulf, 2013), which 91 
urges expert performers to direct attention away from habitual bodily movements. 92 
However, Shusterman (2008), in his critique of Western philosophy's neglect of bodily 93 
knowledge, argues that inefficient habits must be deliberately subjected to conscious 94 
critical reflection so that they can be worked on in a precise manner in the interest of self-95 
improvement.  96 
This latter idea is challenging for sport psychology because substantial evidence 97 
indicates that implicit learning (i.e., where knowledge of bodily movement is inaccessible 98 
to consciousness) can aid skill acquisition (see Masters, 2000; Masters & Maxwell, 2004) 99 
and that any attempt to consciously monitor or control movement during on-line 100 
performance is likely to result in the disruption of skilled performance (e.g., Beilock et al. 101 
2002; Jackson, Ashford, & Norsworthy, 2006). Accordingly, researchers and sport 102 
psychologists typically exhort performers to direct their attention away from bodily 103 
movements in the practice context and to rely on spontaneity in guiding habitual 104 
movement patterns during competitive performance (see Weiss & Reber, 2012). We 105 
question this advice, however, and argue instead that although directing attention away 106 
from the body may be acceptable when people are performing habitual movements in a 107 
smooth and efficient manner, it is counterproductive in situations where performers’ 108 
movements have become problematic or inefficient. We further propose that these latter 109 
difficulties are virtually inevitable at some point in every athlete’s career - because we all 110 
tend to “lapse into bad habits of performance or face new conditions of the self (through 111 
injury, fatigue, growth, aging, and so on) and new environments in which we need to 112 
correct, relearn, and adjust our habits of spontaneous performance” (Shusterman, 2008, p. 113 




138). Echoing these latter words, we propose that paying attention consciously to 114 
inefficient bodily habits is the first step in deliberate practice.  115 
In support of our argument that somatic awareness has been undervalued to date, 116 
considerable anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that expert performers often try to 117 
improve their movement proficiency by deliberately and consciously refining their 118 
technique during practice. For example, in July 2012, Rory McIlroy, the world’s number 119 
one ranked golfer at the time, appeared to be experiencing a performance slump having 120 
failed to make the halfway ‘cut’ in a number of recent high profile tournaments (e.g., US 121 
Open). During this period, McIlroy’s coach Michael Bannon suggested that his poor form 122 
could be attributed to a specific flaw in his swing – namely, the possibility that he was 123 
getting underneath the plane on the downswing and that the club was travelling far too 124 
much on the inside and hence inducing a miss to the right of the target (Carter, 2012). To 125 
address this flaw, McIlroy underwent what Bannon described as a ‘fine tuning process’ 126 
which hinged on the player learning to consciously discriminate between the inefficient 127 
downswing position of his club and the desirable or more efficient one. Four weeks after 128 
struggling to make the cut in the British Open, McIlroy achieved a spectacular 8 stroke 129 
victory in the USPGA Championship. Clearly, McIlroy’s quest for technical 130 
improvement prompted him to make deliberate conscious refinements to his golf swing 131 
in the practice context. Such refinements are not isolated idiosyncrasies, but instead, 132 
appear to be a common feature of many elite sports performers’ training regimes (Collins 133 
et al. 1999). Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that coaches regularly construct 134 
practice activities that allow elite performers to consciously refine inefficient technical 135 
movements (e.g., Hanin et al. 2002; Hanin, Malvela, & Hanina, 2004). In these 136 




circumstances, spontaneity of skill execution is replaced by deliberate and conscious 137 
attempts by athletes to alter and improve their movement during practice.  138 
How can Shusterman's (2008, 2011) theory of ‘somaesthetic awareness’ help us 139 
better understand the mechanisms which mediate continuous improvement in expert 140 
athletes? One way is by encouraging researchers to question their assumptions about the 141 
detrimental effects of bodily-focused attention. To explain, Shusterman (2011) set out to 142 
explore “the differences between those occasions when heightened somatic consciousness 143 
is helpful and when it is detrimental” (Shusterman, 2011, p. 319). Proclaiming that 144 
learning is never complete, Shusterman (2011) argues that somatic attention is necessary 145 
for expertise because without critical self-reflection, we often lapse into bad habits of 146 
performance (as evidenced in the above case of Rory McIlroy). Furthermore, we cannot 147 
trust these ‘attenuated’ habits to correct themselves through unconscious trial and error or 148 
by directing attention away from bodily movement (i.e., adopting an external focus of 149 
attention). Unfortunately, adopting either of the latter approaches will merely “reinforce 150 
these bad habits and the damage they cause” (Shusterman, 2008, p. 169).  151 
Shusterman’s model proposes that the reconstruction of habitual movement is a 152 
two-stage process. First, the performer must be somaesthetically aware of the efficiency 153 
of his or her current movement mechanics. Here, Shusterman is not suggesting that 154 
performers should monitor on-line performance in a way that would prove detrimental to 155 
skill execution (e.g., by focusing on part-process goals) but rather, that they should pay 156 
attention to the “proprioceptive feel of what we are doing” (2009, p. 138). This focus of 157 
attention merely requires the performer to be aware of their movement and whether it is 158 
causing discomfort or some other outcome that is unusual or undesirable. Accordingly, it 159 




seems reminiscent of the goal of mindfulness training – to develop non-judgmental 160 
awareness of oneself (Kabat-Zinn, 2005). In seeking to develop an athlete’s somaesthetic 161 
awareness during training, a coach may use strategically placed mirrors to help the athlete 162 
become aware of how they appear when adopting various postures (e.g., their spine angle 163 
when addressing a golf shot) or when achieving certain movement positions (e.g., top of 164 
the golfer’s backswing). By noting the proprioceptive sensations in different postures 165 
(e.g., a stooped or hunched posture versus a more upright posture at address), it seems 166 
plausible that the golfer could begin to associate different visual “forms” with different 167 
proprioceptive feelings. Having engaged in a program of such associative training, 168 
athletes could learn to infer from their proprioceptive feelings what their movement or 169 
posture looks like in actual competitive performance. Research has shown how visuo-170 
motor mirror neurons are discharged when an individual performs a motor movement and 171 
when the individual sees such actions performed by others (or by themselves; see 172 
Rizzolati & Craighero, 2004) – thereby helping to explain how an athlete might integrate 173 
visual and motor-proprioceptive perception. Interestingly, recent research by Teper, 174 
Segal, and Inzlicht (2013) suggest that mindfulness training is linked to enhanced 175 
executive control and improved attentional processing.  176 
According to Shusterman (2012), athletes may use somaesthetic awareness during 177 
deliberate practice or in competition to identify failures in performance or when coaches 178 
are telling them that they are “doing something awkward, peculiar, or detrimental” (p. 179 
212). Furthermore, elite athletes are subject to demanding performance schedules which 180 
often mean that they are away from home for weeks or months at a time and thus may 181 
have little opportunity to consult their coaches. Developing somaesthetic awareness of 182 




the efficacy of their movement may represent the key psychological mechanism which 183 
allows athletes to move beyond pure reliance on coaches' feedback and helps them to 184 
analyze or critique their own skills, practice, shortcomings etc (Starkes, 2008). 185 
Second, performers often work with coaches to alter, refine, and improve these 186 
‘attenuated’ habits. In doing so, the attenuated habit must be brought into conscious 187 
reflection (during deliberate practice) so it can be “grasped and worked on more 188 
precisely” (Shusterman, 2009, p. 135). In this regard, a number of researchers (e.g., 189 
Collins et al. 1999; Hanin et al. 2002) have shown how conscious bodily awareness 190 
allows the performer to discover the difference between old, undesirable techniques and 191 
new, more efficient movement patterns. According to Shusterman (2008), we must 192 
inhibit the problematic habit and replace it with a superior mode of response. The coach 193 
may achieve this by manipulating the athlete's body and helping him or her gain a new 194 
and reliable sensory appreciation of the desired movement. This process could inhibit the 195 
tendency of “end-gaining” and, instead, ensure that the athlete learns to focus on the 196 
means (e.g., correct shoulder turn in the golfer's backswing) involved in reaching an end 197 
(e.g., generating club-head speed at impact). Collins et al.’s (1999) intervention sought to 198 
inhibit undesirable technique by utilising ‘contrast’ drills which initially increased an elite 199 
javelin thrower’s physical and mental awareness of correct versus incorrect movement 200 
positioning. It is important to initiate the change process by driving a ‘wedge’ between 201 
the current and desired movement pattern to “generate a distinction and realize the 202 
required changes” (Carson & Collins, 2011, p. 152). The ultimate goal of this process is 203 
to ensure that the new movement can be internalized or automatized to the extent that its 204 
on-line execution during competitive performance no longer requires conscious control. 205 




Once the inefficient movement patterns have been identified through somatic 206 
reflection and the more efficient pattern has subsequently been habituated through 207 
extensive practice, Shusterman (2012) argues that conscious attention may be 208 
relinquished and we may move into the more unreflective spontaneous mode where our 209 
attention can be focused on the external targets of our action (echoing Wulf’s, 2013, 210 
emphasis on an external focus of attention), not on the somatic or conscious means of 211 
achieving them. However, although the newly acquired movement pattern should now be 212 
guided by spontaneity (or with minimal conscious control) during on-line competitive 213 
performance the performer must remain somaesthetically aware of their movement and 214 
continue to evaluate its overall efficacy. Such continuous critical reflection appears 215 
necessary as habitual behavior is continually threatened by factors such as injury, aging, 216 
growth, and so on (see Bissell, 2013; Shusterman, 2008). By remaining somaesthetically 217 
aware of their movement, athletes can identify when they have lapsed into bad habits of 218 
performance in a competitive context and choose to return to a ‘cognitive’ phase of 219 
learning where they can consciously correct or adjust these ‘attenuated’ habits of 220 
spontaneous performance in the practice context.  221 
An important feature of Shusterman’s model concerns the proposed existence of 222 
interchanging phases or stages of learning. To explain, Shusterman’s theory of body 223 
consciousness is cyclical in the sense that the maintenance and enhancement of 224 
performance efficiency requires the skilled performer to alternate between different 225 
modes of bodily awareness. This represents a novel perspective as many influential 226 
theories of skill acquisition (which have had a profound influence on sport expertise 227 
research e.g., information processing theories) have argued that skill acquisition occurs in 228 




a unidirectional manner (i.e., it moves from the cognitive to the associative to the 229 
procedural stage). Accordingly, some expertise researchers have emphasized the role 230 
procedural knowledge (i.e., automatic processing) plays in guiding skilled performance 231 
(for example, see Masters & Maxwell, 2008) and downplayed the utility of conscious 232 
bodily awareness. By contrast, other researchers (e.g., Ericsson, 2006) have argued that 233 
continuous improvement is reliant on the performer counteracting automaticity by 234 
remaining within the cognitive and associative stages. Unfortunately, these perspectives 235 
appear to have constructed an unhelpful dichotomization (between automatic/reflective 236 
and unconscious/unreflective awareness) that ignores the growing body of anecdotal and 237 
empirical evidence which suggests that continuous improvement requires skilled athletes 238 
to alternate between cognitive and procedural modes of processing.  239 
We argue that Shusterman’s (2008) theory may provide a useful bridge between 240 
these dichotomies by helping to explain how expert performers “continuously cycle back 241 
and forth between these stages depending on the current level at which they are 242 
performing” (Gray, 2004, p. 52). According to Shusterman’s perspective, the skilled 243 
athlete who is moving proficiently should remain within the ‘automatic phase’ (contrary 244 
to Ericsson’s advice). However, when the athlete acquires an attenuated habit they should 245 
return to the cognitive or associative phase (contrary to many contemporary perspectives; 246 
e.g., Weiss & Reber, 2012) and seek to consciously refine their movement during 247 
deliberate practice. Following a systematic method of constructive conscious control (see 248 
Carson & Collins, 2011, FIVE-A model of technical change) during deliberate practice 249 
may be crucial in ‘pressure-proofing’ the new movement pattern.  250 




In seeking to explore this issue, future research could use diary studies and 251 
interviews to explore how skilled athletes use somaesthetic awareness to alternate 252 
between different modes of bodily awareness over the course of a competitive season. In 253 
doing so, researchers could ask athletes to note why they have chosen to focus on 254 
improving a specific aspect of movement during practice (i.e., did they or their coach 255 
identify the problem), the process by which they have gone about automatising the new 256 
movement (i.e., the specific drills they have used), the level of concentration required to 257 
make the adjustment, the extent to which they enjoyed the process, and, finally, whether 258 
the technical refinement resulted in improved performance in the competitive 259 
environment. Ultimately, this type of investigation would help skill acquisition 260 
researchers and coaches grasp a more comprehensive understanding of the role bodily 261 
awareness plays in facilitating continuous improvement at the elite level of sport. 262 
In the present paper, we have drawn on theoretical argument and empirical 263 
evidence to argue that some expert athletes seek to improve their technical skills by using 264 
somaesthetic awareness to alternate between reflective and unreflective modes of 265 
conscious bodily attention. Although the deliberate practice literature has yet to fully 266 
consider this latter issue, Shusterman’s (2008) theory of somaesthetic awareness suggests 267 
that bodily-directed attentional processes are crucial in this regard. To conclude, we hope 268 
that our comments in this paper will encourage expertise researchers inspired by Janet 269 
Starkes’ studies to investigate the role of conscious attentional processes in mediating 270 
continuous improvement in athletes.  271 
 272 
 273 
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